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Trust is vital for individuals to flourish and have a sense of well-
being in their community. A trusting society allows people to feel 
safe, communicate with each other and engage with those who are 
different to themselves without feeling fearful. In this article, I 
employ an Aristotelian framework in order to identify trust as a 
virtue and I defend the need to cultivate trust in children. I discuss 
the case study of Buranda State School in Queensland, Australia, 
as an instance of successful school reform that reinstates trust in 
an educational setting. Buranda makes use of the community of 
inquiry (CoI) pedagogy practiced by advocates of philosophy for 
children (P4C). Educators may create a safe space in the 
classroom by using the CoI and giving children the chance to voice 
their ideas and build upon, as well as question, those of others in a 
democratic and respectful manner. Through this pragmatic 
dialogue, trust may be established, along with a sense of belonging 
that supports well-being in the classroom as well as in life.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Trust is vital for individuals to flourish and have a sense of well-being in their 
community. A trusting society allows people to feel safe, communicate with each 
other and engage with those who are different to themselves without feeling 
fearful. Interpersonal or relational trust highlights our nature as social selves and 
this incorporates an aspect of vulnerability. Karen Frost-Arnold (2014) notes that 
“this vulnerability makes trustworthiness both a moral and epistemic virtue” (p. 
1957). Frost-Arnold draws upon the work of Annette Baier (1984; 1992), who 
notes that parents have to find the right balance between teaching their children 
to be trusting and trustworthy, and avoid the two extremes of undue timidity or 
fear and suspicion (Baier, 1992, pp. 140-141). If trust is a virtue, which I claim it 
is, then it is a topic of interest to moral philosophers. Trust is also a topic of 
interest to teachers and parents when we refer to cultivating a trusting and 
trustworthy attitude in children.  
 
Robert Solomon and Fernando Flores answer the question of “why talk about 
trust?” in their book, Building Trust (2003, p.153): 
 
Why talk about trust? Not only because trust has long been 
neglected as an essential philosophical and ethical concept, but 
also because talking about trust is essential to building trust. Even if 
talking about trust can be awkward or uncomfortable, it is only by 
talking about trust, and trusting, that trust can be created, 
maintained and restored. 
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Solomon and Flores (2003, p. 154) refer to (responsible) trust as a conscious 
choice that may be chosen over the fashionable option of being cynical. One 
way we can approach creating trustworthy and trusting individuals is by 
examining early childhood education. Baier (1992, p. 141) notes that we do 
seem to have some innate capacity for trusting and meeting trust. In these 
formative years, trust as a relational attitude should be nurtured so that children 
develop into trusting and trustworthy citizens. 
 
In this article, I defend the need to cultivate trust and I discuss the case study of 
Buranda State School in Queensland, Australia, as an instance of successful 
school reform that reinstates trust in an educational setting. Buranda makes use 
of the CoI pedagogy practiced by advocates of P4C philosophy for or with 
children which has been successfully used in kindergarten classrooms with pre-
primary children (Daniel & Delsol, 2005), as well as being used in primary and 
high school classrooms. P4C is a useful praxis that allows educators to create a 
safe space in their classroom whereby children have the chance to voice their 
ideas and build upon, as well as question, those of others in a democratic and 
respectful manner. Through this pragmatic dialogue, trust may be established, 
along with a sense of belonging that supports well-being in the classroom as 
well as in life. 
 
 
Why trust? 
 
Baier (1992) asserts that her “assumption will be that we would, other things 
equal, prefer to be able both to trust individual persons and rely on the 
institutions that structure their conduct, so prefer to be able to regard it a good 
thing if people are trusting people” (p. 137). This may be a modernist 
assumption; nonetheless, Nishikawa and Stolle (2012) note that fewer and fewer 
people think that others can be trusted. This claim rests on their analysis of a 
range of data including surveys, past research and media reports, and they cite 
that in the 1960s in the USA, 55% thought you could trust others, yet by 1999 
that figure had dropped to 34% (p. 133). Nishikawa and Stolle point out that, 
apart from Robert Putnam (2000) speaking about how children are socialised to 
trust (or not) through technological means such as media and television, there is 
little writing on how we can raise children to be trusting citizens. Nishikawa and 
Stolle (2012) find this lack of literature odd given that “trust is one of the most 
fundamental prosocial attitudes that is believed to be developed early in one’s 
childhood” (p. 134).  
 
Cultural expectations of trust can differ. Baier (1992) notes that “there are 
varying climates of trust” (p. 143) that are influenced by history and social 
context. Nishikawa and Stolle (2012) point out that “parents are believed to 
influence and shape general attitudes of their offspring . . . which includes 
trusting strangers and people not known, children in several countries get the 
message early in life: it is a dangerous world outside” (p. 134). Yet not trusting 
others makes it difficult to function in a community and, provided trust is 
reasonable or warranted, a trusting attitude has an important role to play in 
helping individuals flourish in society. Trust allows individuals to connect with 
and support others, by engaging and communicating with others who may be 
different from themselves. In fact: 
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Generalized trust has been regarded as an important ingredient for 
social and political life. In the political sphere, generalized trust 
allows citizens to join forces in social and political groups. . . . In the 
social sphere, generalized trust facilitates life in diverse societies, 
fosters acts of tolerance, and promotes acceptance of others (2012, 
pp. 136-137). 
 
Given that Nishikawa and Stolle identify the positive features of generalised 
trust, it makes sense that they then question how trust may be shaped in 
childhood. Their research investigates the communication and role modelling 
done in families which may be influenced by fear. Fear can be engendered 
through media reports and televised news programs. However, I will focus on 
the school environment and offer educational institutions as another place that 
can communicate and model a healthy attitude towards trusting and 
trustworthiness. If (pre-) schools and teachers can be trusted and the students 
feel safe in their school/centre environment, this greatly contributes to the well-
being of a community and its individual members. Such well-being will be further 
enhanced if children are treated as trusted members of a community from an 
early age. This accounts for the need to practice building trust in the pre-school 
classroom. 
 
 
Defining trust 
 
We must firstly commence our discussion by offering a definition of trust. 
Following Carolyn McLeod (2014): 
 
Trust is an attitude that we have towards people whom we hope will 
be trustworthy, where trustworthiness is a property, not an attitude. 
Trust and trustworthiness are therefore distinct although, ideally, 
those whom we trust will be trustworthy, and those who are 
trustworthy will be trusted. For trust to be warranted (i.e. plausible) 
in a relationship, the parties to that relationship must have attitudes 
toward one another that permit trust. Moreover, for trust to be 
warranted (i.e. well-grounded), both parties must be trustworthy. 
 
In this article, I will utilise a virtue ethics framework to claim that trust is a virtue 
as it lies mid-point on the scale between naivety and cynicism. Aristotle (1876) 
explains that, because humans are rational and social creatures, we must work 
together collaboratively in order to be happy, and the best way to achieve this is 
by practicing rational habits of action known as the virtues. In his Nicomachean 
Ethics (1876), Aristotle claims that humans aim at eudaimonia, often translated 
as happiness, but better referred to as flourishing. Trust is a virtue because this 
character trait, along with being trustworthy, assists us to achieve eudaimonia. 
Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is the method we use to figure out what we 
should do by considering our subjective situation. The virtuous response will be 
mid-point between excessive and deficient behaviour. Furthermore, the virtues 
do not stand alone but, rather, they go together, and phronesis or practical 
wisdom requires that virtues such as trust are supported by discernment and 
prudence. If educators are to nurture the trusting nature of children, they must 
also encourage the critical thinking skills that accompany good decision making 
so that children know when and who to trust. Misplaced or blind trust is not a 
virtue and is unlikely to result in happiness. 
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Nancy Nyquist Potter (2004) defines a trustworthy person as,  
 
one who can be counted on, as a matter of the sort of person he or 
she is, to take care of those things that others entrust to one and 
(following the Doctrine of the Mean) whose ways of caring are 
neither excessive nor deficient. (p. 16) 
 
If trust is a virtue, then the excessive quality of naivety and the deficient quality 
of cynicism may, on this framework, be considered vices. The virtues are things 
that assist individuals to live a flourishing life, so these character traits lie at the 
heart of one’s well-being. We learn the virtues early on through the habits of 
actions we practice that are influenced by our environment and upbringing, our 
peers and role models. A person’s character is developed according to their 
habitual actions. Aristotle (1876, book 11, chap. 1) explains that the virtues arise 
in us neither according to nature nor contrary to nature, but nature gives us the 
capacity to acquire the virtues, and they are only attained via habituation. The 
trustworthy person, then, is habitually trustworthy. Furthermore, society will 
flourish if its members are virtuous and able to trust one another.  
 
Trust, as one of the virtues, is therefore an essential ingredient for a flourishing 
life; being able to trust is vital to one’s well-being. Braddock (2010, p. 310) offers 
an empirical defence of what he calls the “Aristotelian Virtue Condition (AVC)”: 
namely, the Aristotelian claim that “moral virtue is (noninstrumentally) necessary 
for human well-being” (p. 295). In using the term “well-being”, Braddock 
deliberately moves away from the traditional Neo-Aristotelian use of the word 
“happiness" in order to more accurately defend the kind of flourishing to which 
we refer when we say the virtues are necessary for eudaimonia. If we accept 
that trust is a virtue and, as such, is conducive to our well-being, then we must 
ask how we go about cultivating trust and trustworthiness from an early age. 
Role modelling will occur at home as well as at school, commencing with pre-
school and kindergarten. Thus early childhood educators are uniquely 
positioned to cultivate a trusting environment from which children can learn 
appropriate prosocial behaviours such as being trustworthy. A trusting 
educational environment will also include trustworthy teachers, parents and 
administrators within the school community who are also able to trust one 
another.  
 
 
Trust and vulnerability  
 
Trust is a difficult concept to define yet we can see that trust is a relational 
attitude. A utilitarian or functional account of trust claims that someone is trusted 
when they can be relied upon, yet this seems to be too narrow a definition that 
does not capture the nuance or emotionality of the concept of what it means to 
be trustworthy. The functional account of trust also fails to consider the intention 
of the moral agent upon whom I trust. Intention is an important consideration as, 
for example, I rely upon an alarm clock and when it lets me down I may feel 
disappointed but this is a different feeling to when I am let down by a close 
friend. Indeed, having my trust betrayed is a personal feeling and this differs to 
my being let down by the postman who, if they fail to deliver my urgent letter 
may leave me feeling annoyed or disappointed, yet I am unlikely to feel 
personally betrayed. To attribute trustworthiness to someone is more than 
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simply saying that we can rely upon them; as Baier (1986) explains, “trusting 
can be betrayed, or at least let down, and not just disappointed” (p. 235).  
 
Trusting does have an aspect of making oneself vulnerable by opening up to the 
possibility of being laughed at, taken advantage of or being tricked. Pamela 
Hieronymi (2008) points out that you can rely on someone without trusting them. 
In this instance, if the person you rely on lets you down, you may be 
disappointed, but it is only if you trusted them that you would feel betrayed. 
Hieronymi (2008, p. 215) asserts: 
 
I will take vulnerability to betrayal as a kind of touchstone for trust: 
whereas misplaced reliance is merely disappointed, a trust is 
betrayed. Thus, one trusts only if one in some way risks betrayal 
should one be disappointed. Otherwise, one merely relies, or 
perhaps only acts-as-if one trusts. 
 
Thus, trust makes us vulnerable; however, it is still better to trust than to not, 
even though we should rightly practice discernment and not trust blindly.  
 
There are several factors that relational trust seems to require for trust to be 
considered rational or warranted. Bryk and Schneider (2003) report on a 
longitudinal study they conducted of 400 elementary schools in Chicago, USA, 
whereby they compiled evidence that indicated trust was a central factor in 
successful school reform. Alongside structural conditions (such as funding), Bryk 
and Schneider claim effective educational communities require human 
resources such as trust and respect in order to effect positive change (2003, p. 
40). They state that: 
 
Relational trust is grounded in the social respect that comes from 
the kinds of social discourse that take place across the school 
community. Respectful exchanges are marked by genuinely 
listening to what each person has to say and by taking these views 
into account in subsequent actions. Even when people disagree, 
individuals can still feel valued if others respect their opinions. (p. 
42) 
 
Alongside respect, relational trust requires personal regard, which often rests on 
competence and personal integrity. Personal regard, according to Bryk and 
Schneider, “springs from the willingness of participants to extend themselves 
beyond the formal requirements of a job definition or a union contract” (p. 42), 
and competence relates to the participant’s ability to successfully achieve 
desirable outcomes. Personal integrity is a judgement made of one’s character 
and their morals. Teachers and parents will value one another if they believe 
each is placing the welfare of the children first, as this illuminates the moral 
perspective guiding one’s behaviour and work ethic (p. 43). Finally, a crucial 
factor that supports school reform and assists to cultivate feelings of trust 
alongside loyalty to a school is the role modelling done at a leadership level. 
Bryk and Schneider note that “principals’ actions play a key role in developing 
and sustaining relational trust” (p. 44). 
 
Knowing who and when to trust is a matter of discernment and practical wisdom. 
As Aristotle pointed out, this practical wisdom is not something that is taught, but 
rather must be learnt by doing. Kraut (2014) explains: 
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Ethical virtue is fully developed only when it is combined with 
practical wisdom. A low-grade form of ethical virtue emerges in us 
during childhood as we are repeatedly placed in situations that call 
for appropriate actions and emotions; but as we rely less on others 
and become capable of doing more of our own thinking, we learn to 
develop a larger picture of human life, our deliberative skills 
improve, and our emotional responses are perfected. 
 
Virtuous character traits such as trustworthiness therefore need to be practiced. 
As trust is conducive to students’ well-being and educational improvement, we 
may consider how to cultivate trust in the classroom. 
 
 
Cultivating trust 
 
In order to create a trusting society, we must consider building trustworthiness 
and trust in individuals. One way we can practice trust is through a community of 
inquiry (CoI), the methodology practiced by advocates of philosophy in schools 
and philosophy for children (P4C). Matthew Lipman (1991) started P4C in the 
1970s, drawing heavily on the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey (1997, 
2004). Claiming that philosophy need not be confined to universities, Lipman 
maintained that children could practice critical thinking skills through the use of 
dialogue and by using age-appropriate narratives as a stimulus text. Lipman 
(1991) defines critical thinking as “thinking that (1) facilitates judgment because 
it (2) relies on criteria, (3) is self-correcting, and (4) is sensitive to context” (p. 
116). By thoughtfully discussing stories that contain philosophical concepts, 
Lipman hoped to encourage children to ultimately develop into reasonable and 
democratic citizens. Along with critical thinking skills, Laurance Splitter and Ann 
Sharp added “caring” and “creative” thinking as equally important skills children 
should be encouraged to develop (Splitter & Sharp, 1995). Therefore, P4C aims 
at shaping critical, caring and creative thinkers. 
 
A central pedagogy in the P4C classroom is a CoI. The CoI is a democratic 
discussion that is led by the participants and facilitated by a teacher. This 
radicalises the role of teacher who is thinking alongside children as opposed to 
simply giving students information that they need to learn and be able to recite. 
The CoI takes seriously the idea that children have their own ideas, questions 
and voices that are worth listening to and exploring. If Karen Murris (2013) is 
correct, then we need to listen carefully for children’s wisdom and not mistakenly 
attribute a lack of knowledge and wisdom to them. Epistemic injustice occurs 
when we make implicit as well as explicit assumptions and prejudices about 
children and childhood, including stereotypes that children are typically 
immature and ill-informed. Rather, Murris cites the need for epistemic trust, 
modesty and equality. By respecting the wisdom children have, children 
themselves are encouraged to trust their own wisdom and continue to further 
develop practical wisdom that supports their well-being in the world.  
 
Murris admits that stereotypes of children as unknowing are difficult to shake, 
but claims that she is not usually referring to instances of information exchange 
(although she does not rule those out). Instead, she is referring to the child’s 
ability to engage philosophically with concepts and allow new ideas to emerge 
through dialogue or hermeneutic practice. Murris (2015) further explains: 
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When thinking alongside children, everyone needs to ‘give’ their 
mind to what there is to think about, which is only possible when 
adults are also ‘open-minded’, have epistemic modesty and 
epistemic trust. If what children say is not heard (but laughed at) – 
epistemic equality is absent. (p. 334) 
 
The aim of the CoI is to encourage children to think for themselves and trust 
their own thinking abilities. Thinking is therefore both individual and collective: 
there is the reflective thinking that is done as an isolated individual, and there is 
also the thinking that is done in a group whereby ideas are built upon 
communally as well as challenged or questioned. In a CoI children are often 
seated in a circle facing each other and the teacher facilitates a discussion 
based on the students’ own questions. In order to generate the students’ 
questions, teachers may firstly read a stimulus text such as Thinking Stories by 
Phil Cam and facilitate an activity using a question quadrant (Cam, 2006) or by 
playing a game such as “Would you rather?” (http://p4c.com/articles/nursery-
question-board). 
 
The question quadrant is a pedagogical tool that is used after an age-
appropriate stimulus text is read. Note that the stimulus text does not have to be 
a narrative; a news article, short video or artwork could be used provided it 
stimulates the students’ imaginations. From the text, students are encouraged to 
brainstorm questions, which form the focal point for later discussion. The 
questions the children come up with may be scribed by the teacher on a 
whiteboard and then later voted upon in order to gain a consensus as to which 
question should be the central focus of the CoI discussion. Cam’s question 
quadrant divides questions into four different types: open and closed questions; 
and textual and intellectual questions. Thus, questions are categorised as either 
closed and answered in the text; closed and answerable by consulting an 
“expert” (intellectual); open and answerable by pondering the text (imaginative); 
or open and intellectual, which are the philosophical questions to which there 
are usually more than one answer. The CoI should be based upon a 
philosophical question and encourages participants to explore ideas 
collaboratively in a democratic fashion. Students participating in a CoI may grow 
in self-esteem and confidence as they recognise themselves as one amongst a 
group of learners. As Laurance Splitter (2011) explains: 
 
Participating in a CoI allows students, individually and 
collaboratively, to develop their own ideas and perspectives based 
on appropriately rigorous modes of thinking and against the 
background of a thorough understanding and appreciation of those 
ideas and perspectives that, having stood the test of time, may be 
represented as society’s best view of things to date. (p. 497) 
 
However, there seems to be a need for students to trust each other in the first 
instance for the CoI to work well. If there is a lack of trust, a blocked CoI may 
result. 
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An effective community of philosophical inquiry  
 
Burgh and Yorshansky (2011) reflect on Ann Sharp’s (1993, pp. 338–40) 
description of a well-functioning as opposed to blocked community of 
philosophical inquiry: 
 
In a well functioning community of inquiry participants move from 
considering themselves and their accomplishments as all important. 
They become conscious of other members’ contributions and allow 
themselves to transform themselves, eventually becoming part of 
an interdependent whole. However, in order for this to happen, trust 
and care of the community must be in place. The absence of care 
and trust often result in a blocked inquiry in which some members 
are overpowered by fear and other emotions that keep them from 
sharing their views and ideas with the community. According to 
Sharp, this is a sign that something is very wrong. (2011, p. 445) 
 
If a CoI requires participants to trust each other from the outset, then we have a 
chicken-or-egg scenario here. Some trust must be present in the group for 
discussion in the CoI to begin and to gain momentum. Only then can a well-
functioning CoI hope to further build upon the trust the participants have in each 
other that allows them to open up enough to discuss various perspectives and 
ideas. Yet Burgh and Yorshansky (2011) suggest that “behaviours typically seen 
as blocked inquiry could also provide opportunities for growth” (p. 445). The 
opportunity provided here is precisely in understanding whether or not the group 
dynamic is allowing for trust and caring relationships to take place. Crucial at 
this juncture is the role of the facilitator in recognising the group dynamics at 
play and then being creative and able to manipulate or alter the group 
discussion or activities so that new dynamics can be discovered and 
established. It becomes obvious in such scenarios that the role of the facilitator 
is not always easy as the teacher is aiming towards a goal of shared and truly 
democratic dialogue within the CoI, which allows all its members to feel safe and 
secure when entering into philosophical deliberation. 
 
When it is functioning well, a CoI can assist in developing the bonds of trust 
between members of the group, which translates well into classroom and 
schoolyard behaviour. As the CoI allows participants to practice hearing multiple 
perspectives, students are then better at resolving conflicts that occur when they 
disagree. Furthermore, the CoI can enhance student self-esteem as they learn 
to trust themselves and their own ideas. Developing the students’ own questions 
is a central component of the P4C praxis, and these ideas are explored as well 
as challenged. Centrally, the CoI aims at truth that is shared and democratic. 
Susan Gardner (2015) highlights why the role of the CoI facilitator is vital in 
assisting students to deepen their understanding by practicing critical, creative, 
caring and collaborative thinking skills: 
 
Having said that the facilitator must be ruthless in ensuring quality 
of thought, relevance, consistently (or the awareness of the lack 
thereof) with the thoughts of others as well as the topic under 
discussion, the facilitator must also create an environment which is 
“relatively” risk-free. If students believe that they will be “crucified” 
or ridiculed or embarrassed if they are not able to do what in fact 
they are not yet able to do, i.e., think well, they may be reluctant to 
 - 53 - 
speak up in class at all and then the whole process will come to a 
grinding halt. So the facilitator needs to be merciful with regard to 
the quality of what is actually said while being merciless with regard 
to the attempt for depth. (p. 15) 
 
One practical way that teachers may practice their skills as facilitators and build 
the bonds of trust with other teachers in their school is to sit in a CoI of their 
own. If teachers have the chance to participate in a CoI they gain a sense of 
what it is like to participate in a CoI as a member of a group rather than solely as 
the facilitator, and this may further inform their pedagogical practice. David 
Kennedy (2015) suggests teachers sit in on a CoI that explores teachers’ 
assumptions about children and childhood that projects onto their treatment of 
children. This is one method by which teachers could reflect upon their role in 
creating space to listen to children’s voices, as mentioned earlier in relation to 
challenging stereotypes of children as unknowing. 
 
One of the benefits of the CoI is that students are encouraged to work towards 
establishing truth, or justified beliefs. In helping a student to look for good 
evidence to support their ideas or those of others, and encouraging them to 
notice when such evidence is lacking, the student can start to trust their own 
ability to critically discern what they should believe and what they should 
question. This is empowering. When developed in a communal setting like a CoI 
it is also useful as the participant begins to see themselves as a member of a 
group of inquirers. In the CoI, individuals are encouraged to reflect upon their 
own ideas as well as those of others and to be open to new information as it 
comes to light. Thus the process of inquiry leading to knowledge is structured 
but democratic, dynamic, self-correcting, and resists collapse into relativism by 
continuing dialogue rather than ending a conversation when opinions differ 
(Golding, 2011, pp. 476 & 482).  
 
Having said that, when conducting CoIs with five year olds, Daniel and Delsol 
(2005, p. 82) discovered that after having conducted philosophy in the 
kindergarten classroom over the course of a year, the students had evolved to a 
position of relativism. This move was considered an improvement on the 
students’ original thinking skills because the children had initially started with a 
fixed perspective or opinion that seemed to them so obviously true it did not 
require any justification. From this solipsistic stance whereby only their own 
opinion was considered as truth, the students came to understand that others 
had ideas and beliefs and opinions that differed to their own. The children 
learned that there were other perspectives on what was “true” or “right” and this 
led to a pluralistic account of truth that was related to intersubjectivity. Daniel 
and Delsol (2005) remark: 
 
Intersubjectivity presupposes that pupils are, to a certain extent, 
aware that they need their peers in order to transcend their own 
beliefs and concepts, to increase coherence in their judgments, and 
to construct their comprehension of the world. (p. 82) 
 
The thinking skills that are developed in an early childhood P4C classroom rest 
on the idea that the meaning we make in the world is shared and, in this way, 
democratic. Therefore, we need to trust others with whom we share this 
experience of making meaning – which will also include challenging ideas as 
well as justifying the meaning we make as individuals. For children who continue 
 - 54 - 
to practice philosophy in the classroom and participate in well-functioning CoIs, 
they will further develop their critical thinking skills with a view to becoming 
reasonable citizens. Daniel and Delsol (2005) identify that reasonableness is 
what prevents children resorting to violence in school settings.  
 
Crucially, pluralistic truth need not result in subjectivism. As the CoI aims at 
truth, the resistance of collapse into subjectivism is important as not all ideas are 
of equal value. This is particularly relevant when dealing with moral questions 
and ethical concepts. After young children develop the relativistic stance after 
having only been solipsistic in their worldview, the next step is for them to 
practice critical engagement with multiple perspectives with a view to formulating 
shared truth. Seeking truth or shared values involves discarding the ‘worst’ ideas 
and seeking justification for the better ideas. Defending the existence of “shared 
values” is a pragmatic claim made by contemporary Aristotelians such as 
Alasdair MacIntyre. While some values are contextual—for example, different 
cultures have various cultural traditions—there are still common, human values 
that are shared or normative. Such universal values include “do not 
unnecessarily harm another” or “we should protect children” (MacIntyre, 2007). 
While the interpretation of these values may vary over time and across cultures, 
they may also be debated and judged. As MacIntyre (2007) explains, “a living 
tradition then is a historically extended, socially embodied argument” (p. 222). 
The important thing about dialogue is that we work together to gain an ever-
improved understanding of ideas and practices that promote human well-being.  
 
The problem with a relativistic stance is that it stops dialogue because it 
assumes that we are all radically different from one another. Subjectivism and 
cultural relativism, for instance, ends discussion by simply stating “what is true 
for me is true for me and what is true for you is true for you.” Oddly, the culturally 
bound truth is absolute for those within that culture, and one can only proclaim 
cultural relativism by rising above it (and giving it up) in order to view all 
culturally bound truth as relative. In this way, cultural relativism is self-refuting 
(Quine, 1975). In relation to a CoI, shared truth is aimed at and thus truth is 
viewed pragmatically as pluralistic, not relativistic. It is important to note that the 
role of the facilitator and, by association, teacher training becomes central to the 
successful nature of CoIs whereby the discussion need not collapse into 
subjectivism (Gardner, 2015; Golding, 2011; Bleazby, 2011). 
 
 
A case study: Buranda State School 
 
An interesting case study in the effectiveness of P4C can be found in a primary 
school located in Queensland, Australia. Lynne Hinton was the principal of 
Buranda State School from 1996 to the end of 2009. When she first arrived at 
the school, Buranda was part of the federally funded “Disadvantaged Schools 
Program” and the later “Special Programs School Scheme” due to the low socio-
economic area in which it was set as identified by census data (Golding, Gurr, & 
Hinton, 2012, p. 94). Due to Hinton’s leadership and innovation, Buranda 
transformed from being, “a small, declining, inner city primary school where 
students were generally disengaged and achieving poor academic results, to a 
thriving school with outstanding academic results, well above state and national 
means in all aspects of literacy and numeracy” (Golding, Gurr, & Hinton, 2012, 
p. 94; Hinton, 2003). Hinton transformed Buranda State School into a “thinking 
school” by employing P4C methodology in order to educate students to “think 
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clearly, reason well and make sound judgements, and become reflective, 
thoughtful, well-rounded and responsible young people” (Golding, Gurr, & 
Hinton, 2012, p. 94). 
 
The whole-school P4C approach trialled at Buranda primary school provides us 
with impressive empirical results as the school transformed from a difficult, low-
achieving institution with behavioural problems in the schoolyard and classroom 
to an environment that was positive. This change was initiated by Hinton leading 
the teachers at the school to create a new, shared vision (Hinton, 2003, p. 49) 
with a view to improving student outcomes. This was successfully achieved by 
implementing the P4C pedagogy. The change was evident in the playground 
where there was less bullying, and also in the classroom, whereby students 
displayed thinking skills that demonstrated they were able to reflect upon their 
own ideas and treat others fairly (Burgh, Field, & Freakley, 2006).  
 
Along with the case study of Buranda, there is further empirical evidence that 
children who engage in the CoI approach when studying philosophy in the 
classroom are more likely to achieve better academic results along with 
additional social benefits such as better self-esteem and the demonstration of 
empathy for others (Millett & Tapper, 2012). I would also argue that trust was 
gained at Buranda—a trust in the school and its teachers, as well as amongst 
the students. As was evident in the research conducted by Bryk and Schneider 
(2003) in the USA, effective leadership supported positive school reform at 
Buranda. Each person would have started to trust the environment in which they 
found themselves, and would have then slowly been able to trust themselves in 
order to eventually give expression to their own ideas within this educational 
context. Trust would have played a role in the increased happiness and success 
of the school, which also improved the well-being of the students, those 
employed by the school as well as the wider community. 
 
 
Trust and well-being: Concluding thoughts 
 
While practicing philosophical inquiry in the classroom, students are asked to 
listen to their own voices and work on developing their questions and ideas. 
They are also asked to work collaboratively with others, which involves trusting 
as well as being trustworthy. The earlier such training is commenced, including 
in pre-primary and kindergarten classrooms, the better. The P4C classroom 
aims at creating a safe space in which children are given a voice and also asked 
to listen to and reflect upon the voices of others. When this works well, trust is 
established along with a feeling of well-being. By engaging in CoI discussions, 
students have the opportunity to pursue truth for its own sake, as opposed to 
simply being asked to regurgitate facts. Teachers and educational institutions 
have an important role to play in helping to shape good citizens. We must train 
the good habits of the rational individual that include critical and creative 
thinking, the intellectual and moral virtues such as trust and trustworthiness, 
along with discernment and empathy. Such skills are required to flourish and 
may be applied not only to intellectual work but also to our social lives and even 
the technological sources of information with which we engage routinely in 
today’s society (D’Olimpio, 2013).  
 
By defining trust as a virtue that is necessary for a sense of well-being, I have 
offered one way in which we can cultivate trust and practice being trustworthy in 
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an educational context. P4C methodology, including the community of 
philosophical inquiry, allows students to practice critical reflection and 
collaborative thinking while aiming at shared, democratic truth. The CoI 
pedagogy practiced by advocates of philosophy for children is a useful praxis 
that allows children to build upon, as well as question, their own ideas as well as 
those of others in a respectful manner. Self-confidence and self-trust can grow 
as children learn to be discerning and prudent. Trust in others may also be 
cultivated in the P4C classroom, contributing to a general sense of well-being 
not only in the classroom or the schoolyard, but also in life. 
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